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Introduction 
 
Over the next century, urban regions will furnish the context of social, economic 
and political life for a growing majority of the world’s citizens. This transformation will 
almost surely have pervasive consequences for politics, public life and culture. Cities are 
as old as civilization, and the urban/rural divide has long been a central theme of work on 
political modernization. Yet social scientists are only beginning to examine the 
consequences of a world in which most or nearly all people live in or around urban 
centers.  
The shape of contemporary urban regions increasingly sets them apart from the 
urban centers of earlier eras. Rather than a sharp divide between urban and rural, 
demographers around the world now recognize metropolitan regions as the predominant 
form of settlement. Interlinked urban centers, and zones of partly urbanized settlement 
linked to those centers, surround all major urban concentrations. Numerous trends have 
converged to turn cities into urban regions. Urbanized concentrations have grown bigger, 
new transportation and communication technologies have increased mobility among 
places. Increasing numbers of residents, and sometimes firms, have found it economical 
to retain the benefits associated with urban centers even in peripheral locations. With 
growing affluence, middle class residents have found it increasingly possible to buy the 
amenities of rural and small town life without sacrificing urban advantages. Middle and 
upper-middle class residents moving to suburban areas have escaped close contact with 
the urban or the rural poor. Ethnic and racial majorities have separated themselves from 
the minorities and immigrant populations of more central urban areas. 
With these trends, metropolitan areas and locations within them have emerged as 
important contextual conditions of politics and governance. Neither the national units that 
still predominate in cross-national comparative studies of politics, nor the individual-
level analysis typical of survey research, permit full scrutiny of the ways these conditions 
operate. An increasingly established literature in North America has pointed to a number 
of effects from suburban residence on political behavior that cannot simply be reduced to 
the different social or economic composition of cities and suburbs, as has been shown for 
the US (see Gainsborough 2001; 2005; Kelleher and Lowery 2004; Oliver 2000; 2001; 
Oliver and Ha 2007; Orfield 2002), and Canada (Walks 2006). It seems likely that place-
based effects rooted in metropolitan contexts can also account for aspects of the 
widespread cultural shifts that have swept across the developed world over the last 
several decades (Inglehart 1997; Clark and Hoffmann-Martinot 2000). 
Similarly, work on policy and governance in the United States has developed 
extensive analyses of the effects from the governmental fragmentation and political 
polarization there (seeStephens and Wikstrom 2000; Orfield 2002; Feiock 2004). 
Although scholars outside the US have also increasingly turned their attention to 
metropolitan governance (see Jouve and Lefèvre 2002; Heinelt and Kübler 2005), side-
by-side cross national comparison of these issues remains the exception.  
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The International Metropolitan Observatory 
 
In summer 2002, Jefferey Sellers and Vincent Hoffmann-Martinot launched the 
International Metropolitan Observatory (IMO) as a program for comparative cross-
national research on politics and governance in metropolitan regions. The IMO has a dual 
aim. At the same time it seeks to gather and systematize a global database of information 
on critical aspects of metropolitan regions, it is also undertaking a coordinated series of 
workshops to analyze crucial and little-understood aspects of politics and governance in 
these settings from a systematic transnational perspective.  
In a first phase, the IMO project had to confront the challenge to define its subject 
– metropolitan regions – in consistent, cross-nationally comparable ways. Based on a 
definition that stresses commuting and economic ties between localities as a basis for 
inclusion within a metropolitan area, a first publication (Hoffmann-Martinot and Sellers 
2005b) gives a comparative overview of recent metropolitan developments and the 
political changes associated with it in fifteen countries in North America, Western 
Europe and beyond. The picture that emerges from this analysis is that metropolitan 
regions are clearly becoming the predominant mode of human settlement. This 
development goes hand in hand with three further trends (Hoffmann-Martinot and Sellers 
2005a): a trend toward suburbanization (i.e. an increasing proportion of residents in 
metropolitan areas live outside the central cities), increasing geopolitical fragmentation 
(i.e. a complexifying pattern of jurisdictions dealing with metropolitan policies), as well 
as socio-economic polarization (i.e. disparities between various sub-regions within 
metropolitan areas, mostly between core cities and suburbs). First exploratory analyses 
on political behavior within metropolitan areas also suggested that such socio-territorial 
polarization is linked to political polarization, e.g. producing diverging political 
majorities in core cities and in suburban zones.  
This provisional conclusion of the first phase provided the starting point of the 
second phase of the IMO project. Its aim precisely was to examine the relationship 
between the socio-territorial structuring of metropolitan areas and the patterns of political 
behavior that can be observed therein. In a workshop held in Stuttgart in early 2007, 
participants from twelve countries presented their analyses on this question. On the basis 
of multi-level regression techniques, most of the contributions showed a significant effect 
of socio-territorial characteristics of metropolitan places on the political behavior of their 
inhabitants. This analysis provided interesting insights into the ways by which socio-
territorial recomposition of metropolitan regions affects political behavior therein. In 
particular, in several countries, analyses were able to show that such effects are not only 
rooted in a change of the socio-economic composition of a given locality, but that there 
are also specific place-based effects that are linked to the transformation of the 
contextual characteristics of localities in the wake of the metropolitanization process. 
While research conducted in phase two of the IMO project was able to provide a deeper 
understanding of the political ecology of metropolitan regions, it has not assessed the 
actual relevance of this metropolitanization of politics for steering the further 
development of metropolitan areas and for solving the social and political problems that 
emerge therein. 
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Metropolitan governance and social inequality 
This precisely is the aim of the third phase of the IMO project, started after the 
Stuttgart workshop in early 2007. Research in this phase will build on the political, 
economic and spatial data already collected in previous phases to analyze patterns of 
governance and metropolitan fiscal disparities throughout the countries under study. In 
order to understand the ways in which the metropolitanization of politics affects 
metropolitan policy-making, it was agreed to focus on the issues of social inequalities 
that unfold in metropolitan regions.  
Indeed, the metropolitanization of politics and governance has special relevance 
for the question of equality. In ways that differ systematically among distinct national 
contexts, social inequality has meant spatial inequalities. Inequality among metropolitan 
places can also mean inequality in the delivery of services. But politics, policies and 
institutional arrangements also offer means that can limit the degree to which social 
inequality translates into spatial inequality. Some of the policies and institutions that limit 
these spatial inequalities may be situated at the national or other higher levels. Others 
may trace to initiatives and governance within metropolitan areas themselves. 
Research in the context of the IMO has assembled an unrivalled dataset for 
examining the social and spatial patterns in metropolitan areas and for scrutinizing their 
consequences for governance. Existing IMO datasets for most of the participating 
countries already offer a rich basis to assess metropolitan demographic, electoral and 
other patterns within metropolitan areas. In this paper we sketch a research agenda that 
would draw on this previous research to analyze the governance of spatial inequalities in 
metropolitan areas. For the first time, this agenda would shift to the outputs of 
governance at the metropolitan level. The agenda we propose addresses three questions:  
(1) whether spatial disadvantages arising from concentrations of poverty and 
related forms of social exclusion have been compounded by disparities in government 
services;  
 (2) whether the spatial and governance dynamics of metropolitan areas have 
enabled more affluent citizens to obtain lower tax obligations and/or enjoy distinctive 
service arrangements, and  
(3) whether horizontal as well as vertical arrangements for interlocal cooperation 
within metropolitan areas have tempered or reinforced these two different types of 
disparities in service provision. 
Comparison will also enable testing of a number of leading hypotheses about 
metropolitan inequality, and the transnational, national and local influences on it. At the 
local and regional level, the analysis will explore how patterns of governance have 
responded to and helped reinforce local sorting among firms and residents according to 
social and economic patterns. Cross-national comparison will enable testing of how 
national differences in social and economic inequality and national institutions for local 
and metropolitan governance have affected these local patterns. Comparisons within and 
between counties will also permit examination of the global influences that have often 
been held out as pervasive influences on local governance, such as global financial and 
corporate networks and immigration. 
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The Theoretical Background 
Around the world, there is a widespread sense that systems of policymaking and 
governing are undergoing far-reaching changes. A widely perceived trend toward 
decentralization (Sellers 2002; Brenner 2003) is one element in a variety of shifts in need 
of greater study. Much of this work, encapsulated under the term “governance,” points to 
various forms of ordering and policy determinations that defy traditional types of formal 
government hierarchies and formal governmental action (Pierre 2000).  One of the most 
crucial questions to this literature is how different practices of governance influence the 
outputs of public policy for ordinary citizens. 
The problem of interlocal or horizontal governance is central to this literature.   
The relation among different local or subnational units has long been recognized as an 
important dimension (Gregg 1974).  As metropolitan areas have emerged as the 
predominant form of human settlement in most of the developed world, replacing both 
rural and purely urban forms, the interlocal dimension of metropolitan governance has 
increasingly become central to wider patterns of governance. As the initial investigations 
of the International Metropolitan Observatory Project in fifteen countries showed, 
metropolitan areas now contain half or more of the population in all of the most 
developed countries outside of Scandinavia (Hoffmann-Martinot and Sellers 2005).  In 
the largest metropolitan areas of nearly all countries, and in a majority of metropolitan 
areas in many of them, most of the population lives outside the central cities in a 
fragmented, often segregated patchwork of local jurisdictions. 
The sociospatial and economic inequalities within metropolitan areas reflect 
wider patterns of inequality, but can also aggravate or add to them.  Social and economic 
inequality has always been a pervasive feature of developed democracies.  It poses even 
more difficulties in developing and transitional countries.  A considerable body of 
literature contends that, with the transition from manufacturing to service economies, 
changes in national policy and other recent shifts, these national social and economic 
inequalities have grown (e.g., Osberg, Sneeding and Schwabish 2004).   As metropolitan 
areas have attracted more socially, ethnically and racially diverse populations, aggregate 
studies suggest that lower levels of redistributive policies and even lower levels of public 
goods provision may ensue (Alesina, Baqir and Easterly 1999).  An investigation at the 
metropolitan level will enable us to examine how much horizontal disparities between 
places contribute to these effects, or compound them with interlocal disparities in 
governmental services.  
Initial IMO analyses showed several types of metropolitan inequality to be 
common to metropolitan areas across the developed world (Hoffmann-Martinot and 
Sellers 2005).  Many of these spatial inequalities existed across the full range of 
differences in developed country political economies, welfare states, and planning$ 
regimes.  Portions of both the most disadvantaged citizens and immigrants and the more 
privileged residents often concentrated in distinct parts of metropolitan areas.   The 
question proposed for phase three of the project is how these patterns, and the interlocal 
and institutional dynamics linked to them, produce parallel inequalities in the delivery of 
goods and services from public policies. 
Several bodies of theory provide a rich basis for analysis of how the fragmented 
metropolis would affect patterns of governance, and specifically the relation to 
inequality. Rather than resolve the conflicting claims of these theories we recommend a 
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pluralistic theoretical framework that draws on their empirical predictions, which 
frequently converge.  
a.    A line of institutionalist argument linked to metropolitan reform argues that 
more consolidated governmental forms are crucial to provision of public goods and 
socially equitable policies for metropolitan communities (Lowery 2000).  Earlier versions 
of this work stress externalities and scale efficiencies as reasons to seek synoptic, 
hierarchical institutional forms of metropolitan governance.  More recent versions have 
pursued more flexible, limited and localized institutional means to address the same 
problems (Dente 1990).  Both versions point to the need for institutions that can 
overcome free-riding by municipalities and “joint decision traps” associated with 
horizontal coordination among multiple governments (Scharpf 1988).   This argument 
would view government and governance at the metropolitan level as critical to promoting 
equal services. 
b. Public choice theory has opposed the reformist tradition with an alternative 
approach that has favored decentralization to the local level.  Here the analysis looks to 
local participation and exit from metropolitan communities as mechanisms to secure 
accountability.    Fiscal federalism, a line of analysis begun by Tiebout (1956), 
characterizes a market among jurisdictions as a mechanism for the allocation of locally 
specific public goods.   Firms and residents sort among communities according to tastes 
as well as according to ability to pay the taxes for different levels of services.  Treatments 
of the implications from this process include Brown and Oates (1987) and Oates and 
Schwab (1988).  Fischel (2003) goes so far as to assert that homeowners, because of their 
interest in property values in their community, will vote to fund services they do not 
benefit from directly.  Although the market mechanism in this theory could lead to 
disparities in services according to abilities to pay, Tieboutian sorting should also lead to 
a wide variety of local service levels among communities with similar means but 
different preferences. 
c.    One line of analysis, most developed in the United States, points to 
ethnocultural and class divisions as sources of inequalities in governance.  This 
perspective, which has dominated much of the U.S. work on metropolitan areas and their 
governance (Massey and Denton 1993; Sellers 1999; Gainsborough 2001), analyzes 
metropolitan divisions mainly in terms of class, ethnicity and race.  Ceteris paribus, this 
approach would predict the greatest inequalities in services in metropolitan areas with a 
high degree of spatial segregation by class and race, and in distributive issues in the 
provision of services. 
d.    Work on the international political economy and cities has reinforced an 
already established line of work on the place of an urban region in national hierarchies of 
cities (Dente 1990).   The most recent versions of this work highlight relations with the 
global economy as the source of differences in governance at the local and metropolitan 
level.  Originally formulated around economic globalization, in the form of growing 
transnational connections among localities, capital and social mobility, these accounts 
have even more sweep when they encompass “translocalization” within countries.   
Sassen (1991) and others point to economic imperatives in global economic centers, 
including mobilization around business services, that produce greater segregation.   
f.    National institutions and policies remain an under-explored influence on 
metropolitan inequalities in services.  Exploring these effects is one of the most important 
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functions a cross-national comparative analysis can serve.  A number of authors suggest 
that national elements are important for governance at the local metropolitan level.  
Kübler (2006), building on a European tradition of analysis that distinguishes differences 
between systems of local government, notes that traditional differences between the local 
government systems of Northern and Southern Europe have led to different trajectories in 
the development of institutional arrangements for metropolitan governance.  In analyzing 
differences in patterns of metropolitan segregation, Musterd (2005) points to welfare 
states in such countries as the Netherlands to account for more limited segregation of 
neighborhoods.   
g.    No account of governance would be complete without attention to the 
dynamics of politics within individual communities, including such variables as local 
ideology, parties, local political organization, local political movements and local 
leadership (cf. Oliver 2001).   
A cross-national comparative account of this sort must consider these influences 
in light of such broad social differences in national contexts as the greater ethnoracial 
diversity of the United States, Canada, and Israel, and the differences in wealth between 
Western and Eastern Europe or developed and developing countries.  The point of the 
analysis, however, is to show effects beyond the compositional inequalities at the national 
level.  We expect to find that metropolitan spatial inequalities exert effects on inequality 
beyond those evident in national data on inequality and diversity.  Similar patterns of 
inequality may have similar effects at the metropolitan level regardless of the differences 
in national aggregate inequality. 
The increasing availability of data on local governance has for the first time made 
an exploration of these issues possible.  As the first phases of the International 
Metropolitan Observatory Project have demonstrated, the tremendous quantities of 
unexploited data at the local level now make it possible for cross-national metropolitan 
analysis to attain levels of precision and detail that long were feasible only at the country 
level. Hence, the ambition of the IMO project is to strive for rigorous statistical analysis 
of quantitative data on the delivery of public goods and services relevant to social 
inequalities in metropolitan areas. However, we need to pay attention to the issues of 
availability and cross-national comparability of such data that is likely to be structured by 
the institutional and political specifics of metropolitan policy-making within each 
country. Proper contextualization of the various cases under scrutiny is therefore crucial 
to the generalizeability of the comparative analysis. More than the previous phases, IMO 
phase III therefore also emphasizes qualitative information about governance 
arrangements, processes and choices in the fields of metropolitan policy making under 
scrutiny.  
Outline of the proposed research 
The analysis we propose would focus on the recent evolution of (1) governmental 
resources and (2) governmental services at the local and metropolitan area across a 
selection of large metropolitan areas (with populations over 200,000) in each IMO 
country. We propose an analysis that would begin with a description of the significant 
contextual specifics of metropolitan governance and policy-making in a number of 
comparable policy fields relevant to the issue of social inequalities (see below). On this 
basis, relevant indicators of governmental income and spending at the local and 
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metropolitan level would be identified for each country. . Combined with other 
qualitative and quantitative materials, the analysis would assess inequalities in 
government income and service outputs and how these have evolved. The overall aim is 
to show whether and how the current nature of the patterns identified their possible 
evolution is linked to and can be explained by the institutional and political dynamics 
identified in phase I and II of IMO.   
The income side could be assessed using fiscal variables such as tax entries, tax 
rates, direct revenues from user charges, as well as transfer payments from other 
government levels. Evidently, the relevance of these categories in the different national 
context will strongly dependent on the “fiscal constitution” of each country. 
The outputs side could be assessed by focusing on several policy categories that 
are widely recognized to be relevant to the issue of social inequality and for which budget 
data can be assumed to be available to provide mostly comparable indicators: 
First is developmental policy, which aims at promoting local development.  
Second is redistributive policy, which aims at promoting equity or the needs of 
disadvantaged residents.  (For development of these categories see Peterson 1995:  pp. 
64-65.)  Our third area is amenities policy which aims at promoting local environmental, 
cultural, recreational and related goods and services.  While the one of the important 
areas of developmental policy is constructing physical infrastructure, this amenities 
policy has to do more with what Denters and Sterkenburg (2006, p. 8) call the “social 
infrastructure”.  Government spending in these categories as well as overall can be 
analyzed in relation to population or, for further illumination, in relation to relevant 
population categories like proportions of poor people or numbers of highest status 
workers.  
One important issue will be how to classify the various policies into these broad 
types.  For example, take educational policy.  Certain educational policies aim to mainly 
aid disadvantaged children, while others do not.  Paul Peterson classifies this as 
developmental policy as they are vital to the development of the community (Peterson 
1995:  p. 65).  This might therefore be taken as an independent category. 
Another example is safety.  Although many feel that this would be developmental 
in a sense that these are expenditures that would encourage development, there is also a 
case that safety is a “quality of life” or amenity issue.   Since safety responsibilities like 
police services are also a higher level government function in most of the IMO countries 
(the U.S. being an exception), it might also be wise to separate this function out from the 
main categories. 
We recommend that a specific protocol be worked out in collaboration among 
IMO participants to address this issue.  One starting point for this could be the U.S. 
Census of Governments classifications (http://www.census.gov/govs/www/class.html) 
and similar national systems.   For classification into the three broad categories, we will 
require a consensual understanding among the group. Another possibility could be to 
identify “indicator services” (like indicator species in biodiversity research) 
representative for each policy category. This would notably allow to overcome 
difficulties of cross-national comparison in the sense that much of the classification 
problem is due to varying salience of the issues addressed in the different policy 
categories under scrutiny. (E.g. “safety” may be a major amenity issue in US 
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metropolitan areas, whereas in the Swiss context, nuisances stemming from motorized 
traffic is generally considered the most pressing amenity issue in an urban context.) 
A second important issue to be addressed is the type of data that will be 
employed.  We recommend budget data as a starting point.  Along with the other 
demographic and political information already collected in the first two IMO phases, 
indicators that will enable us to compare will provide the raw materials for a 
collaborative, comparative analysis of inequality in the outputs of governance.  However, 
for many areas the full extent of local policies goes beyond budgets.   Where possible, it 
will therefore be helpful to add qualitative indicators of government goals and activities 
in these policy areas.   
Analytical Framework and Hypotheses 
The framework we propose considers governance  within a broader comparative 
context that might be termed the governance OF metropolitan areas.  On the one hand, 
our analysis will focus on institutions and policies at higher levels that may be more 
decisive for the cross-national differences than those WITHIN metropolitan areas.  On 
the other hand, our analysis is directed at metropolitan inequalities in the outputs of 
governance at the local as well as the metropolitan and national levels.   The sociospatial, 
political, institutional and policy analysis proposed here is in a sense middle-range.  
Rather than resolve the large differences among theoretical approaches to the topic, we 
propose to focus testing on alternative hypotheses derived from these approaches.  But 
we pose our hypotheses about metropolitan areas and their governance in the broadest 
possible terms (e.g., for developing as well as developed countries), and the IMO Project 
furnishes the most extensive contemporary dataset for testing them. 
The IMO project revealed both affluent concentrations and relatively poor 
concentrations in many metropolitan areas.  In considering inequality, we propose to 
consider both the relative advantages of the former and the relative disadvantages of the 
latter.  Many of the hypotheses about inequality thus have two analytically separate 
dimensions. 
 
Hypotheses about the National/Intermediate Level 
 
We have at least three national patterns that we would like to consider.   
 
1.  Typologies of the welfare state, developed most notably by Gosta Esping-
Andersen (1990).  There are three widely recognized types:   
a. Liberal, based on private welfare provision except for means-tested 
services for the poor; 
b. Christian democratic or conservative, including more generous welfare 
provision but often through private or quasi public provision and with only limited 
egalitarian elements; 
c. Social-democratic, based on egalitarian welfare provision through public 
means. 
 
These types have obvious implications for inequality at all levels (Goodin et al., 
1999; Musterd 2005).  They also correspond at least in part to different systems of 
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central-local relations (Sellers and Lidström 2007).   Yet there has been little attention to 
how they are connected to inequalities between places within metropolitan areas, and 
especially to local governance.   
 
2.   National patterns of central local relations.  We could say there are three 
categories.   
a. The first is a relation of local autonomy.  Sub-national governments are 
given autonomy from the higher level governments mostly through legal and 
constitutional measures.  They do not have to worry about the administrative control.  
They could decide their tax level and services.  They do this mostly with their own 
revenues.  In other words, they do not count on the other sources. 
b. The second an integrated relationship.  Their localities are not as 
autonomous as those in Autonomous model.  On the other hand, they operate their own 
functions along with the implementation of the policies of the higher governments.  In 
this sense, they have the principle of co-governance.  Most likely, they are given a power 
of general competence.  In other words, they do not have to be authorized to start their 
policies.  “They have the right of initiative in conducting its own affairs; they are free to 
exercise all their powers as long as they do not conflict with national or provincial 
legislations” (Denters and Sterkenburg 2007, p.5).  Another way of characterizing this is 
the one of power-sharing.  
c. Finally, in a centralized relationship between localities and higher level 
governments, the localities are neither autonomous nor integrated.  They cannot decide 
the level of taxation nor of services. 
 
Table 1:  Varieties of Central-local relations 
 
Autonomous Operate with its own resources 
Integrated (power-sharing) a general competence and principle of co-
governance 
Centralized neither autonomous nor integrated 
 
 
 3.  The third national classification concerns the egalitarian aspirations among 
localities.  This classification analyzes the aggregate of policies to equalize the inputs or 
the outputs of local governments.  The strength of fiscal equalization schemes is the 
centerpiece, but it could also include other supportive policies.  Building on the Denters 
and Sterkenburg (2007) characterizations, there are five types here. 
 The first alternatives would be no redistribution.  Here, differences in tax and 
service levels between municipalities are tolerated.  The Tiebout model (1956) 
exemplifies the logic by which localities would offer potential residents a wide array of 
choices in both areas.  This alternative can thus be considered a Tieboutian arrangement.   
The second and the third alternatives attempt to reduce inequalities among places, but not 
totally equalize taxes and services among them.  In the second, higher level governments 
would provide local governments with limited compensatory transfers or other policies.  
In the third, higher level governments would provide local governments with the same 
financial resources.   
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In a fourth alternative, policies for equalization would take into account 
differences in revenue capacity and in collective needs.  Higher level governments will 
therefore try to reduce inequalities in the revenue capacity by giving more money to some 
of the localities, say bigger central cities or places with concentrations of disadvantaged 
residents.  
 The fifth and sixth categories aim at full equalization.  The fifth attempts to 
equalize local service capacities, as higher governments try to offer citizens with similar 
needs the same level and quality of basic services.  The last type embodies the highest 
level of aspirations toward equalization.  This would not attempt to equalize not only 
local capacities, but also the actual level of local services for all citizens. 
 
Table 2:  Varieties of Interlocal Fiscal (and Policy) Equalization 
 
1) Tieboutian Differences in tax and service levels 
between municipalities accepted/promoted 
2)  Partial equalization  Partial reduction of inequalities in revenues 
or services 
3) Provision of same financial resources for 
municipalities 
Reducing inequalities in the revenue 
capacity  
4) Beyond financial resource equalization, 
differences in revenue capacity and in 
collective needs are taken into account 
Reducing inequalities in local service 
capacities 
5) Full equalization of local service 
capacities 
To offer citizens with similar needs the 
same level and quality of basic services 
6) Full equalization of the actual local 
services for all citizens 
Equalization of the actual local services for 
all citizens 
 
 
We expect that types of welfare states and central-local relations correspond to 
different degrees of what might be termed place-egalitarianism.  This is especially true at 
the ends of the place-egalitarian spectrum.  At the nonredistributive end, which we call 
Tieboutian, we would expect a liberal welfare state and a central-local system based on 
local autonomy (Tiebout 1956; Musgrave 1959; Oates 1972).  At the other end, the 
equalization of local services presumes the goals of a social democratic welfare state and 
is consistent with either an integrated system or a centralized one with egalitarian aims.  
Analyses should consider the relation in each national case.   In addition  
 
Hypotheses about consequences from national and intermediate-level place- 
egalitarianism: 
 
1. The more place-egalitarian the national (or intermediate-level) system,  
a. The more redistributive policies equalize in favor of poor localities 
compared to others, and away from affluent localities compared to others 
(This could occur either through local governments themselves, or through 
national or intermediate level government institutions, as in the case of 
Social Security in France or the U.S.) 
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b. The more developmental and amenity policies equalize disadvantages of 
poor localities as compared to others, and direct resources away from 
affluent localities as compared to others.   
2. The more Tieboutian the system, the more a race to the bottom among poor 
communities that lack access to locally raised tax revenues. 
3. The more Tieboutian the system, the more choice among affluent and middle 
class communities.  This could contribute to:   
a. Competition for amenities or in developmental policy; or  
b. Greater variation along ideological or other lines (if this varies). 
 
 
Hypotheses Derived from Internal Local Variables 
 
The second level of hypotheses concerns internal local features that affect local policy.  
Although these effects interact with national and metropolitan influences, the hypotheses 
in this category posit independent mechanisms or processes also affect outputs.  Although 
local differences are partly determined by contextual elements like social structure or 
institutions, the local hypotheses focus on the potential for local agency to affect 
variations in local services. 
 
Several hypotheses about individual localities need to be taken into account in the 
analysis of local patterns.  Two sets of hypotheses link directed to the economic 
conditions that localities face: 
 
1. Fiscal capacities often comprise the centerpiece of economic analyses focused on 
local fiscal disparities.  This refers to the capacities of localities to raise funds for 
local expenditures through local sources of taxation and other mechanisms.  It 
depends partly on higher level rules that stipulate rates, sources and other tax and 
revenue-raising rules.  From discussions in Stuttgart we concluded that it would 
be prohibitively complex to propose a standardized, cross-national measure of 
fiscal capacities.1  Moreover, our analysis aims to focus on equality in local 
outputs rather than capacities themselves.  Within each national analysis, 
however, case studies should consider and compare fiscal capacities as a 
precondition of local choices.     
a. Communities with low fiscal capacities will face pressures to limit 
expenditure on all kinds of services (Pack 1998; Joassaart-Marcelli, Musso 
and Wolch 2005). 
b. Communities with high fiscal capacities  
i. Will have more to spend on all kinds of services, or  
                                                 
1 Tax capacity, and the associated element of “tax effort”  (i.e., the extent to which a community draws on 
its tax capacity), can be defined in a number of ways.  For the most common method used in U.S. local 
government studies, the “representative tax” system, see Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental 
Relations 1990:  M-170, p.3  Since this system is probably too complex to apply on a cross-national basis, 
it may be more appropriate to employ more approximate methods based on available demographic 
indicators of relative wealth of residents.  For some countries, information on workplaces may also make it 
possible to estimate tax capacity for business taxes.  This raises an important area for inquiry beyond the 
scope of the current memo. 
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ii. Will be able to tax themselves less. 
 
2. Functional needs.  Following economic accounts, spillover effects from the 
functions provided by some jurisdictions for other jurisdictions need to be taken 
into account.  These are often linked to the place a jurisdiction will occupy in the 
hierarchy of metropolitan places.  For instance, a central city usually provides 
central infrastructure and other facilities for peripheral communities, necessitating 
higher levels of spending and taxation in the absence of subsidies.  Comparisons 
of local government priorities need to take this into account.  Municipal fiscal 
experts have developed elaborate calculations to do so.  For the present study, we 
believe this set of hypotheses should remain more informal.  Needs of this sort 
should be taken broadly into account, but the analytical focus should be on our 
other hypotheses. 
 
A second cluster of hypotheses address local social and political effects, including local 
political agency: 
 
3. Median voters.  Several hypotheses using the model of median voters can be 
derived from the socioeconomic composition of the community, as measured by 
median income or (more generally) wealth.  These preferences are affected by 
local fiscal capacities and functional needs, but find expression in local political 
processes through elections and policymaking.    
 
a. Poor communities will prefer more redistributive policy, as well as more 
policy on amenities that are related to spillovers from poverty (e.g., crime, 
lack of private recreational opportunities). 
b. Wealthy communities will prefer more spending on developmental 
policies and amenities, or lower taxation. 
 
4. Business and institutional interests.   
 
a. Service centers can be expected to spend more on amenities in comparison 
with development, but may spend more on both (Sellers 2002). 
b. Manufacturing centers should spend less on amenities as opposed to 
development. 
 
5. Local political ideology/culture. 
a. Left parties favor (Denters and Sterkenburg 2007; Sellers 2007) 
i. More redistributive policy,  
ii. More developmental and more redistributive policy (“Local 
Fordist”) 
iii. More policy on amenities when related to spillovers from poverty. 
iv. When Green parties are strong, more on amenities in general 
(Sellers 2002). 
b. Right parties favor 
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i. Especially the market liberal component of the Right, is more in 
favor of developmental policy 
ii. Or , in favor of lower spending across the board 
c. The closer the elections, the more median voters effects dominate over 
partisanship (Denters and Sterkenburg 2007). 
 
Several other hypotheses highlight the effects of interlocal dynamics. 
 
6. Peterson (1981, 1995):  He argues that structural constraints limit the capacities of 
cities.  Local governments in general are situated to pursue developmental 
policies and place less emphasis on redistribution policies.  If local governments 
pursue redistributive polices, they might attract disadvantaged people from around 
the area.  Affluent residents may leave a jurisdiction to avoid higher taxation.  As 
a consequence:   
a. Affluent or poor, local governments would spend more on development. 
b. Affluent or poor, local governments would not spend on redistributive 
policies.  
 
7. Competition for amenities (Glaeser, Kolko and Saiz 2000):  race to the top in the 
provision of these.   
 
8. Internal factors (Hypotheses 1-5) could lead to local advantages or disadvantages 
and competition, and therefore to outcomes skewed in favor of, e.g., affluent 
and/or middle class communities. 
 
 
 
Hypotheses about the Metropolitan Level 
 
Denters and Sterkenburg (pp. 14-15)  proposed four metropolitan models based on levels 
of cooperation.  We add a fifth to encompass the amalgamation of communities as in 
Brazil, Canada and South Africa.   Arranged by degrees of institutional integration, this 
yields the following types: 
 
a. Atomistic: highly fragmented 
b. Voluntary cooperation:  
c. Binding horizontal cooperation 
d. Vertical coordination or functional policy authority 
e. Horizontal amalgamation: local governments may combine voluntarily or 
forcefully, engage in amalgamation in order to take advantage of the economies 
of scale. 
  
These models need to be further analyzed along two additional dimensions: 
 
a.  Which types of policies (developmental, redistributive and amenities) do patterns of 
metropolitan cooperation include? 
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b.  Do communities of different types cooperate (e.g., affluent and poor, or middle class 
and poor), or does cooperation only occur between communities of similar types?  Are 
there types of communities that characteristically do not participate in cooperation? 
 
As Kuebler (2006) has observed, different national central-local systems have tended to 
adopt distinctive forms of metropolitan governance.  The links between these sets of 
variables are likely to complicate the sorting out of metropolitan from national 
influences.  However, we propose for the analysis to focus directly on how both levels of 
influences affect local variations in governance. 
 
Hypotheses: 
 
1. Models of metropolitan governance will affect local variations in outputs:  
a. The more metropolitan institutional integration, 
i. The more disadvantages of poor communities in redistributive, 
developmental and amenities will be limited 
ii. The more the advantages of affluent communities in these domains  
will be limited 
iii. The more limited are  
1. General interlocal trends toward development policy (Local 
Hypothesis 6a) 
2. General interlocal constraints on redistributive policy 
(Local Hypothesis 6b) 
iv. The more limited the race to the top for amenities (Local 
Hypothesis 7) 
b. Possible alternative hypotheses about metropolitan institutional integration 
(due to intermetropolitan competition and/or interlocal, intrametropolitan 
effects).  The more metropolitan integration 
i. The more disadvantages of poor communities reinforced 
ii. The more advantages of affluent communities reinforced 
iii. The stronger the general trends toward 
1. Developmental policy 
2. Constraints on redistributive policy 
iv. The stronger the race to the top for amenitites 
 
2. Political composition of metropolitan governments will affect variations in policy 
at metropolitan and local levels (Arretche 2007) 
a. Left-dominated metropolitan governments will emphasize  
i. redistributive policies,  
ii. both development and redistribution (“Local Fordist”) 
b. Right-dominated metropolitan governments will emphasize  
i. developmental policies,  
ii. or lower taxation across the board 
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Hypotheses about the Global Level 
 
1. The more the metropolitan economy is connected to the global economy (as 
measured by “global cities” indicators), the more  
a. Advantages for concentrations of affluent residents 
b. Local policy more developmental, also amenities (especially for affluent 
residents) 
 
2. Where internal local or national factors (e.g., Left parties, the need of local 
business for low-income service workers) favor redistributive policies, favorable 
positions in the global economy can lead to stronger redistributive efforts 
 
3. Global trends toward local autonomy in national systems are enhancing 
a. Local mobilization around developmental policies 
b. Advantages of affluent jurisdictions 
c. Disadvantages of poor jurisdictions 
 
 
Hypotheses Derived from the Social and Spatial Context 
 
Several different kinds of hypotheses about the social structure of metropolitan areas will 
necessarily frame the analysis of variations in governance.  In part, these can be considered as 
elements to be controlled in analysis focused on the other issues.  But they are also likely to be 
difficult to separate out from and institutions as they are partly path-development products of 
them, and also create different conditions for governance.   
 
1. (Physical size of the metropolitan area.)  The larger and more extensive the 
metropolitan area, the more both affluent and poor localities will offer distinctive 
portfolios of local outputs (within or between political units). 
 
2. The more unequal the social and economic composition of localities within a 
metropolitan region, the more differences among localities will lead to disparities in local 
services. The greater sociospatial inequality within Brazilian, South African and Israeli 
metropolitan areas poses the most dramatic contextual difference of this kind, but similar 
contrasts will  be evident in some US regions. 
 
Methodological Recommendations 
The data analysis will build on demographic and electoral data already being 
analyzed in earlier phases of the IMO Project.   The methodology we propose would 
combine (a) mapping of interlocal and functional as well as general government units for 
selected metropolitan areas and (b) case studies of local and higher-level budget and tax 
data and accompanying patterns of governance for systematically selected localities and 
metropolitan areas, and (c) (where possible) statistical analysis of variations in 
expenditures, taxation and governance across selected metropolitan areas.   
 17
Where possible data collection should be able to account for changes over the last 
decade or so. Whereas qualitative data should therefore focus on developments that have 
occurred in this time period, we also propose collection of quantitative data for at least 
two different time periods (e.g., 1995 and 2005).  This will enable the analyses to address 
hypotheses about recent trends (such as effects from decentralization and globalization) 
as well as to test the robustness of the cross-sectional comparative hypotheses.  Sampling 
by different eras will also enable tests of such hypotheses as party influence over time;  as 
Arretche (2007) shows, longitudinal tests may even substitute for cross-sectional ones.  In 
addition, to average out path-dependent trends in local trajectories, it would be preferable 
to take average figures for more than one consecutive fiscal year in each time period. 
The sample of metropolitan areas within each country should encompass 
examples of principal variants in metropolitan governance arrangements within each 
country (e.g., with and without metropolitan governments).  To enable leverage to 
analyze the consequences of global economic integration, the selection should combine at 
least one of the metropolitan areas most integrated into translocal economies (often the 
largest urban region) along with at least one smaller regional center.  Further 
metropolitan selection should sample insofar as possible on regions of relative growth or 
relative decline.  Where sample sizes are sufficient, hierarchical linear modeling may be 
employed to analyze overall statistical patterns at both the local and the metropolitan 
levels (Bryk and Raudenbush 2001; Snijders and Bosker 1999).  But the central 
expectation is  for a combination of qualitative and quantitative comparative methods 
focused on a small number of metropolitan areas. We can outline several related 
components: 
 
Threshold inquiries.   
a.  Mapping of functional and other interlocal agreements and functional districts 
separate from general purpose governments, by sector of policy (e.g., general 
government, infrastructure, education, security, social services). 
b.   Comparison of demographic and spatial metropolitan characteristics including 
types of towns (along the lines of previous IMO analyses). 
c.    The national context of social and economic inequality, including levels of 
inequality before and after intergovernmental transfers, etc.  (e.g., Osberg, Smeeding and 
Schwabish 2004). 
d.  Analysis of national policies toward place-equality following the discussion of 
national typologies. 
e.  Selection of towns for more intensive comparative case studies within each 
metropolitan area to be studied. 
 
Main inquiries.   
a. Case studies of local expenditures, revenues and other indicators of 
governance in selected communities corresponding to the IMO community types 
1) Testing and further specification of main hypotheses.  
2) Generation of more specific hypothesis about the dynamics of 
metropolitan inequality, causal processes.   
3) Statistical comparisons of levels of spending, revenues, other 
indicators. 
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4) Where more comprehensive data permits, regressions with controls 
such as those in Joassert-Marcelli, Musso and Wolch 2005. 
b. Mapping of interlocal governance arrangements within the metropolitan 
area against local demographics and data on service provision to compare how far the 
arrangements affect the advantages of affluent communities and the disadvantages of 
poor communities. 
c. Comparison within the local case studies of the impact of interlocal 
arrangements on disparities in service provision. 
1) Where part of the metropolitan area is included in separate 
peripheral governments, these should be included in the analysis.   
2) Where a predominant part of metropolitan population lives in 
central city, wards or neighborhoods within this city should be analyzed 
for internal variations in spending that can be separated out. 
3) Whether to look within the municipal level depends on the 
circumstances, and can be determined case by case.  However, for South 
Africa, Brazil, Canada and possibly others, this will be necessary. 
4) Guidelines for intramunicipal analysis will be worked out jointly in 
cooperation among IMO members doing this form of analysis. 
d.           Going beyond budgetary data.   
1) Where expenditures may not tap the most relevant aspects of local 
policies, it will be important to supplement budgetary data with other 
kinds of qualitative and quantitative information about local choices 
that contribute to inequality.  Local housing allocation policies, for 
instance, may be used to more expensive accommodation, more 
owner-occupied houses. 
2) A common protocol to address these additional features could include, 
e.g.: 
i. A systemic qualitative rating system that would include 
specified criteria and categories 
ii. Where relevant, specified quantitative indicators that could be 
used to assess inequality in housing (e.g., census data on 
services, housing prices, etc.) 
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